Quote: Russian politicians are forgetting to look ahead and instead, they completely ignore economic consequences as they focus on their political motivations. Russian merger Gazprom is a state-owned enterprise; all decisions made by the Parliament and government are to be fulfilled even if they contradict the economic profitability policy of the merger. However, imposing actual economic sanctions on politically unstable consumers is not only due to the merger, and more due to the boosting of production efficiency at local facilities and envisaging further business promotion and profitable projects for the international markets. Nevertheles, it should take into account that the Kremlin power has been targeted by Gazprom’s political lobby led by Dmytry Medvedev and the merger is to be become a very decisive instrument for pursuing foreign policy strategic goals. At a time being, GAZPROM is performing gas delivery on the following acceptable routes:
Russia-Ukraine-Slovakia-Czech Republic-Germany-France
Russia-Ukraine-Hungary-Austria Russia-Turkey-Serbia-Hungary-Austria (“Blue Stream-1” and “Blue Stream-2”)
Russia-Georgia-Turkey
Russia-China
Russia-Germany (“Nord Stream”)
The merger has to follow-up the Kremlin’s vision on global political engagement. It was reflected with regard to the NATO Bucharest Summit when some Allies declined MAP granting to Georgia and Ukraine. As it was said many times, dependence of some Western European nations on Russia energy supplies has become the decisive factor for why MAP was denied to these two countries. But, what is the concrete energy dependency factor for Euro-Atlantic cohesion? .
In May 2005, Germany and Russia signed a special agreement to build and launch a new more massive gas pipeline project from St. Petersburg to near the German Hamburg port. The project aims at widening Russia’s economic as well as political presence in the European continent and increasing its leverage in the EU. Germany, under leadership of Shredder and now under leadership of Merkel has been seeking to become a key provider of such interests of its “new ally” as ex-State Chancellor once claimed. The gas pipeline via the Baltic seabed will become the fourth energy corridor supplying Russian energy resources to Western Europe. It could be seen as the last political gift from Gerhard Shredder to his close friend Vladimir Putin, before he lost the battle to Christian Democrat Union’s leader Mrs. Merkel. Despite harsh pessimistic predictions, she gained full support for the project, although it changed national foreign political attitudes toward incumbent Russia's regime. Even though being a new project, it will face being ruined during the political stage of implementation. Russia perceived this change and is forcing moving ahead and pushing for the European context. Namely, President Putin’s visit to Finland in August of 2005 was determined by the willingness of Russia to pursue two main purposes:
persuading the Finish government, as a transit nation in aegis of the project, to pipe out the gas and take an active role in fostering the project towards Germany new government;
As a forthcoming chairman in the EU, Russia aimed to boost the project’s capability and improve the political grounds at the entire European level.
Actually, Putin’s lobbying effort has not been concluded and is still underway. It seems that cautious Finns partially agreed to this undertaking, hoping to gain great profits. However, Russia’s increasing political influence seems less attractive for Finland as well as for the other EU nations, including Germany. The project is estimated to cost at least US$4 billion and Russia will utilize those technological achievements and investment planning mechanisms used for a similar project in the Black Sea, the Turkish Blue Stream gas pipeline. That project has reaped many positives for Russia and the Kremlin expects the same for the Northern gas project. If successful, it will reinforce by and large Russia’s energy monopoly in the European market. Russia earns more than $10 billion annually by transporting gas to Europe, almost 30% of the state budget, therefore, increasing the supply will increase those benefits and the Gazprom merger could become the most powerful corporation not only in Europe, but also in the whole world.
Initially, the pipeline will have one strand, capable of pumping 27.5 billion cubic meters of gas, to be joined in time by a second strand, which will double that capacity. Even more, Gazprom launched a website, http://www.negp.ru, which will update users about the pipeline project. In this regard, many European nations express concern about this international deal and are dissatisfied with the decision of the German government.
The 1.089 km pipeline is set to run from Wyborg near St. Petersburg to Greifswald in Germany. The four billion dollar European pipeline is to be built by Gazprom, which holds a 51 percent stake and German companies "BASF" and "E.ON". Gas is due to begin flowing through the pipeline in 2010. A special operator company "North European Gas Pipeline Company" (NEGPC) was set up to run the project with chairmanship of Gerhard Shredder. Russia already supplies 47% of Germany's natural gas and the pipeline, with an annual capacity of 55 bcm., will be capable of meeting the other half of German needs. The pipeline, more than 1.200 kilometers long, upon its birth, has been hailed by the EU. Willingness to take part in further development of the project has been expressed by Belgium, UK and Holland. Moreover, the Dutch company "Gasuine" proposed utilizing the gas pipeline’s net "Bangzand Baction Line", operative since 1997, to supply further Russian gas via the NEGP to Netherlands, Belgium - where a massive gas depot is to be built (with Gazprom's involvement) equal to that of the Ukrainian one, with an average 7 trillion cubic meter storage capacity- and the UK as well as provide further delivery to Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, it is expected to deliver Russian gas to the USA and Canada via liquefied natural gas (LNG). Although, some concrete suspicions have spurred regarding two key factors:
Full article: http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsid=10264
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Tuesday, April 15, 2008
Lavrov assures Kiev that Putin respects Ukraine's sovereignty
Quote: Russia's top diplomat gave assurances on Tuesday that in a recent speech to NATO leaders, President Vladimir Putin did not seek to undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine.
During the April 2-4 Bucharest summit, Putin gave a closed-door speech to NATO leaders, which reportedly focused on Russian opposition to some NATO members' plans to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance.
"I am convinced that all those who attended the Russia-NATO Council session in Bucharest and then attempted to give Ukraine their interpretation of what the Russian president said, did so with ill intent. The Russian president said nothing that would infringe on Ukraine's sovereignty," Sergei Lavrov told reporters in Moscow after talks with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Ohryzko.
Around the time of the summit, media speculated over a possible deal between the Kremlin and Washington, under which Moscow would tolerate a missile shield in Central Europe in exchange for NATO allowing Georgia and Ukraine to fall back into Moscow's sphere of influence. Just before the summit, Bush rejected such rumors.
At the summit, NATO powers refused to admit Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance's Membership Action Plan, despite Bush's strong support of the countries' bids. The rejection was seen as a response to Putin's threat, made last year, to target missiles at Ukraine if Kiev joins NATO.
Last week, Lavrov reiterated that Russia would do everything possible to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from being admitted to NATO.
In reaction to Moscow's statements on the issue, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry demanded last Saturday that Russian authorities "stop the practice of threats" against Kiev, saying: "Statements by high-ranking Russian officials are anti-Ukrainian... and constitute direct interference in Ukraine's internal affairs."
Full article: http://www.ukrainians.ca/content/view/757/2/lang,en/
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During the April 2-4 Bucharest summit, Putin gave a closed-door speech to NATO leaders, which reportedly focused on Russian opposition to some NATO members' plans to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance.
"I am convinced that all those who attended the Russia-NATO Council session in Bucharest and then attempted to give Ukraine their interpretation of what the Russian president said, did so with ill intent. The Russian president said nothing that would infringe on Ukraine's sovereignty," Sergei Lavrov told reporters in Moscow after talks with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Ohryzko.
Around the time of the summit, media speculated over a possible deal between the Kremlin and Washington, under which Moscow would tolerate a missile shield in Central Europe in exchange for NATO allowing Georgia and Ukraine to fall back into Moscow's sphere of influence. Just before the summit, Bush rejected such rumors.
At the summit, NATO powers refused to admit Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance's Membership Action Plan, despite Bush's strong support of the countries' bids. The rejection was seen as a response to Putin's threat, made last year, to target missiles at Ukraine if Kiev joins NATO.
Last week, Lavrov reiterated that Russia would do everything possible to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from being admitted to NATO.
In reaction to Moscow's statements on the issue, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry demanded last Saturday that Russian authorities "stop the practice of threats" against Kiev, saying: "Statements by high-ranking Russian officials are anti-Ukrainian... and constitute direct interference in Ukraine's internal affairs."
Full article: http://www.ukrainians.ca/content/view/757/2/lang,en/
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Monday, April 14, 2008
Ukraine heads for more tension with Moscow
Quote: Ukraine is likely to be in a position to block Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organisation later this year, giving it significant leverage that it could use in natural gas supply talks or in retaliation over Moscow’s opposition to plans by Ukraine and Georgia to join Nato.
Ukraine’s parliament last week passed the final legislation needed for the country formally to join the trade body within weeks – enabling it then to join the working group handling Russia’s membership bid. President Viktor Yushchenko is expected to sign the ratification this week and notify the WTO’s Geneva headquarters, paving the way for Ukraine to join 30 days later.
Ukraine is not likely to be the only working group member with tough demands for Moscow. But its presence could strain already tense relations between the countries.
Moscow has imposed numerous trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods, notably metals and dairy products, and sharply raised natural gas prices for Kiev since the country’s foreign policy shifted westwards after the Orange revolution of 2004.
Oleksandr Shlapak, deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office, said Kiev would certainly exercise its right to join the working group. “We want to discuss our future trade relations with our partners, and we have a right to this,” he said.
Valery Piatnitsky, Ukraine’s deputy economy minister and head of the country’s WTO delegation, said Kiev would attempt to lift Russian restrictions on Ukrainian goods. But a “political decision” would have to be made on how far Ukraine pursued its demands, for example in seeking leverage to reduce energy price increases.
“We will be able to raise any questions, just as Georgia is doing today. We will have the same powers, but this does not mean we will use them,” he said. “We will certainly seek to remove all trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods ... But if certain issues have already been raised by other countries in the working group, there is no reason for us to raise them.”
Maxim Medvedkov, Russia’s chief WTO negotiator, said Russia was “calm” about the prospect of negotiations with Ukraine, and ready to conduct them “within the framework of this international organisation”.
“Any WTO member has the right to begin negotiations with a country which is joining. Our task is to find a common language with our partners and agree. But what questions there will be from our Ukrainian colleagues, we don’t know,” Mr Medvedkov added, noting that Kiev was sending “very contradictory signals”.
But any delay caused by having to agree with Ukraine could come as a blow after Moscow officials said WTO accession could happen within months....
Full article: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84748c90-0a79-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html
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Ukraine’s parliament last week passed the final legislation needed for the country formally to join the trade body within weeks – enabling it then to join the working group handling Russia’s membership bid. President Viktor Yushchenko is expected to sign the ratification this week and notify the WTO’s Geneva headquarters, paving the way for Ukraine to join 30 days later.
Ukraine is not likely to be the only working group member with tough demands for Moscow. But its presence could strain already tense relations between the countries.
Moscow has imposed numerous trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods, notably metals and dairy products, and sharply raised natural gas prices for Kiev since the country’s foreign policy shifted westwards after the Orange revolution of 2004.
Oleksandr Shlapak, deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office, said Kiev would certainly exercise its right to join the working group. “We want to discuss our future trade relations with our partners, and we have a right to this,” he said.
Valery Piatnitsky, Ukraine’s deputy economy minister and head of the country’s WTO delegation, said Kiev would attempt to lift Russian restrictions on Ukrainian goods. But a “political decision” would have to be made on how far Ukraine pursued its demands, for example in seeking leverage to reduce energy price increases.
“We will be able to raise any questions, just as Georgia is doing today. We will have the same powers, but this does not mean we will use them,” he said. “We will certainly seek to remove all trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods ... But if certain issues have already been raised by other countries in the working group, there is no reason for us to raise them.”
Maxim Medvedkov, Russia’s chief WTO negotiator, said Russia was “calm” about the prospect of negotiations with Ukraine, and ready to conduct them “within the framework of this international organisation”.
“Any WTO member has the right to begin negotiations with a country which is joining. Our task is to find a common language with our partners and agree. But what questions there will be from our Ukrainian colleagues, we don’t know,” Mr Medvedkov added, noting that Kiev was sending “very contradictory signals”.
But any delay caused by having to agree with Ukraine could come as a blow after Moscow officials said WTO accession could happen within months....
Full article: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84748c90-0a79-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html
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Tymoshenko's bloc might disrupt coalition by voting for creation of constitution commission at Rada, Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defense
Quote: bloc faction leader says People's Self-Defense bloc faction hopes that on Tuesday their partners in the coalition - the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko - won't support the creation of the special parliamentary commission for amendments to the Constitution, Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defense Bloc faction leader Viacheslav Kyrylenko said on Monday.
He said the faction had organized the first general meeting of the coalition to save the coalition.
"It will be saved if the faction of the BYT doesn't vote for a draft resolution on the creation of the special commission for amendments to the Constitution together with the Regions Party and the Communist Party of Ukraine," he said.
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775426874&start=6
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He said the faction had organized the first general meeting of the coalition to save the coalition.
"It will be saved if the faction of the BYT doesn't vote for a draft resolution on the creation of the special commission for amendments to the Constitution together with the Regions Party and the Communist Party of Ukraine," he said.
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775426874&start=6
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MOSCOW IS REPEATING THE BALTIC ERROR; Baluyevsky is pushing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO
Quote:
Russia's attitude to the NATO membership aspirations of its neighbors; If Russia wishes to delay NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, it should withdraw its threats and change its tone. It should call on Kiev and Tbilisi to expand cooperation in the areas where this is possible, and discuss disputed issues without any excess publicity.
Moscow is continuing to send contradictory messages to NATO, Ukraine, and Georgia in relation to the NATO membership aspirations of these two countries. Assurances that Russia will not permit relations with these countries to deteriorate are interspersed with threats and supplemented with silence on questions that require public explanations (such as leaks about the possibility of taking away the Crimea). Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky made a controversial statement on Friday, April 11: promising that if Kiev and Tbilisi join NATO, Russia would take "not only military measures," but also "measures of another nature." This has intrigued half the world, but Baluyevsky didn't go into details.
Moscow is giving its opponents more and more pretexts to accuse it of behaving in a militant manner and disrespecting its nearest neighbors. In point of fact, Baluyevsky and whoever writes his lines ought to take a few aspects of the situation into account.
Firstly, the fears raised by Baluyevsky and other proponents of hysteria in relation to Ukraine and Georgia aren't necessarily prevalent in Russian society. Secondly, the promises of military and other measures, generating associations of intensified confrontation, contradict Russia's simultaneous messages to the effect that relations must not be permitted to deteriorate. This provides a pretext for saying that Moscow's policy in an important area of foreign affairs is inconsistent. Thirdly, demonstrating a militant approach to issues that are still being dealt with at the level of politics and diplomacy complicates Russia's relations with its neighbors and NATO (and an even broader circle of countries, given rising apprehensions). Fourthly, a harsh tone from Russia facilitates consolidation among political forces and the public in Ukraine and Georgia, lending strength to proponents of NATO membership.
When we approached NATO Headquarters for comments about Baluyevsky's statements, we were told that "NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is only a matter of time," and that "the choices made by Kiev and Tbilisi have nothing to do with any other countries."
NATO is waiting for Moscow to explain what kind of measures it intends to take. As at April 13, no public explanations had been provided. Neither was there any confirmation or denial of media reports that President Putin, speaking at the NATO summit in Bucharest, had questioned Ukrainian statehood and threatened to annex the Crimea. It's worth noting that under the current Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership Treaty between Moscow and Kiev, both sides undertake to develop "bilateral relations based on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, peaceful conflict resolution, non-use of force or threats of force..."
Full article: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775465125&start=4
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Russia's attitude to the NATO membership aspirations of its neighbors; If Russia wishes to delay NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, it should withdraw its threats and change its tone. It should call on Kiev and Tbilisi to expand cooperation in the areas where this is possible, and discuss disputed issues without any excess publicity.
Moscow is continuing to send contradictory messages to NATO, Ukraine, and Georgia in relation to the NATO membership aspirations of these two countries. Assurances that Russia will not permit relations with these countries to deteriorate are interspersed with threats and supplemented with silence on questions that require public explanations (such as leaks about the possibility of taking away the Crimea). Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky made a controversial statement on Friday, April 11: promising that if Kiev and Tbilisi join NATO, Russia would take "not only military measures," but also "measures of another nature." This has intrigued half the world, but Baluyevsky didn't go into details.
Moscow is giving its opponents more and more pretexts to accuse it of behaving in a militant manner and disrespecting its nearest neighbors. In point of fact, Baluyevsky and whoever writes his lines ought to take a few aspects of the situation into account.
Firstly, the fears raised by Baluyevsky and other proponents of hysteria in relation to Ukraine and Georgia aren't necessarily prevalent in Russian society. Secondly, the promises of military and other measures, generating associations of intensified confrontation, contradict Russia's simultaneous messages to the effect that relations must not be permitted to deteriorate. This provides a pretext for saying that Moscow's policy in an important area of foreign affairs is inconsistent. Thirdly, demonstrating a militant approach to issues that are still being dealt with at the level of politics and diplomacy complicates Russia's relations with its neighbors and NATO (and an even broader circle of countries, given rising apprehensions). Fourthly, a harsh tone from Russia facilitates consolidation among political forces and the public in Ukraine and Georgia, lending strength to proponents of NATO membership.
When we approached NATO Headquarters for comments about Baluyevsky's statements, we were told that "NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is only a matter of time," and that "the choices made by Kiev and Tbilisi have nothing to do with any other countries."
NATO is waiting for Moscow to explain what kind of measures it intends to take. As at April 13, no public explanations had been provided. Neither was there any confirmation or denial of media reports that President Putin, speaking at the NATO summit in Bucharest, had questioned Ukrainian statehood and threatened to annex the Crimea. It's worth noting that under the current Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership Treaty between Moscow and Kiev, both sides undertake to develop "bilateral relations based on the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, peaceful conflict resolution, non-use of force or threats of force..."
Full article: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775465125&start=4
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Ukraine’s WTO entry not to affect gas ties with Russia
Quote: Ratification by the Ukrainian parliament of a law on Ukraine’s entry into the WTO means that in one month the country will be a full member of the World Trade Organization. How will this affect Ukraine’s gas relations with Russia?
Russian experts do not expect Ukraine’s WTO entry to have any significant impact on its ties with Russia in terms of fuel supplies. The WTO imposes no restrictions on the transportation of gas, and Ukraine’s entry should not lead to any changes for Russian oil and gas partners, believes Timur Khairullin, an analyst with Antanta Capital.
“Indeed, there is a small difference in gas transportation fees, but Ukraine could have easily raised them before joining the WTO; entry into this organization provides no additional arguments for Ukraine,” he noted.
Mikhail Zak, at Veles Capital, agrees. Moreover, he suggested that in future, it would be more difficult for Ukraine to maneuver in terms of gas transit: following its entry into the WTO it would have to bring its gas prices as close to European consumer prices as possible.
“Changes in transit terms are unlikely. All parties are in more or less equal conditions, but each has its trump card. Ukraine is unlikely to dictate terms. Russia can survive for a while without gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine, but Ukraine cannot survive without Russian gas,” Zak stressed.
Full article: http://top.rbc.ru/english/index.shtml?/news/english/2008/04/11/11134135_bod.shtml
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Russian experts do not expect Ukraine’s WTO entry to have any significant impact on its ties with Russia in terms of fuel supplies. The WTO imposes no restrictions on the transportation of gas, and Ukraine’s entry should not lead to any changes for Russian oil and gas partners, believes Timur Khairullin, an analyst with Antanta Capital.
“Indeed, there is a small difference in gas transportation fees, but Ukraine could have easily raised them before joining the WTO; entry into this organization provides no additional arguments for Ukraine,” he noted.
Mikhail Zak, at Veles Capital, agrees. Moreover, he suggested that in future, it would be more difficult for Ukraine to maneuver in terms of gas transit: following its entry into the WTO it would have to bring its gas prices as close to European consumer prices as possible.
“Changes in transit terms are unlikely. All parties are in more or less equal conditions, but each has its trump card. Ukraine is unlikely to dictate terms. Russia can survive for a while without gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine, but Ukraine cannot survive without Russian gas,” Zak stressed.
Full article: http://top.rbc.ru/english/index.shtml?/news/english/2008/04/11/11134135_bod.shtml
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Power and Russia’s backyard
Quote: In Winston Churchill’s memoirs, he records a meeting with Stalin in October 1944: “The moment was apt for business, so I said ‘Let us settle our affairs in the Balkans... So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have 90 per cent predominance in Romania, for us to have 90 per cent of the say in Greece and go 50-50 about Yugoslavia?’ While this was being translated, I wrote out the percentages on a half-sheet of paper. I pushed this across to Stalin... There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.”
I was in Georgia – Stalin’s birthplace – last week. The country regained its independence in 1991. But its leaders fear that they may yet be subject to a modern version of the Churchill-Stalin percentages deal – in which the west casually assigns Georgia into Moscow’s “sphere of influence”.
Georgian fears have been stoked by Nato’s failure to give Georgia and Ukraine “membership action plans” at the alliance’s recent summit. It is true that the summit communiqué asserted that the two countries would eventually join Nato. But it is clear that some members of the alliance harbour deep misgivings. François Fillon, the French prime minister, says that: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think it is not the right response to the balance of power in Europe and between Europe and Russia.”
Such language is greeted with dismay in Georgia. Mikhail Saakashvili, the Georgian president, told me last week that Mr Fillon’s comments were: “clearly about spheres of influence, which is bizarre to say the least... What we are talking about is appeasement. And today it might be Georgia and tomorrow Estonia – and then, hypothetically, Finland. Finland was also in Russia’s sphere of influence. It was part of the Russian empire.”
To Mr Saakashvili, spheres of influence belong to the bad old days. US president George W. Bush agrees. He has denounced the Yalta agreement of 1945 – which recognised eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence – as “one of the greatest wrongs of history”.
The arguments against informal recognition of a Russian sphere of influence are powerful. As one western diplomat puts it: “Either the ex-Soviet countries are independent states, or they are not.” As independent countries, Georgia and Ukraine should be free to make their own decisions about their security. As an alliance of free countries, Nato should not allow Russia a veto on who joins the club. In any case, Nato has already let in parts of the former Soviet Union – the three Baltic states – to the alliance. Russia has had to live with this decision.
But the counter-arguments should not be airily dismissed. For all Mr Bush’s impatience with the concept, unstated spheres of influence do still exist in the modern world. There is a powerful moral case for recognising an independent Taiwan. Yet Mr Bush has leant heavily on Taiwan not to declare independence, because China is so implacable on the issue. Taiwan is, de facto, recognised as part of a Chinese sphere of influence.
Georgia and Ukraine are also harder cases than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian culture has deep roots in Ukraine – and opinion polls suggest that the Ukrainian population is divided about Nato membership. Support for Nato membership is much less equivocal in Georgia. But Georgia is locked into territorial disputes with Russia – and its geographical position would make it harder to defend than the Baltic states. Yet, under article five of the Nato treaty, all Nato members would be committed to defending Georgia – a country of less than 5m people – in the event of a Russian attack.
Russia is also stronger and angrier than it was a few years ago, when Nato let in the Balts. And Russia’s concerns are not obviously unreasonable. I was in Georgia at a conference organised by the Brookings Institution. One of the American participants mused: “If the Russians were concluding military alliances with Mexico and Canada, I think we might have some concerns.”
The official American response is less understanding. The Bush administration argues that Nato is a defensive alliance and that Russian concerns are irrational and outmoded. As Mr Bush put it as his recent summit with Mr Putin: “The cold war is over.”
But the Russians are not reassured. On my last visit to Moscow, Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal politician, explained to me that Nato’s military intervention in Kosovo had made it much harder for Russian liberals to make a pro-western case. Yes, Mr Yavlinsky said, Nato might have intervened on human-rights grounds – but the Russian population knows that its own army has committed human rights abuses in Chechnya. If Nato could bomb Belgrade in a war over human rights, why could it not bomb Moscow?
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e40e89f2-0a39-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1
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I was in Georgia – Stalin’s birthplace – last week. The country regained its independence in 1991. But its leaders fear that they may yet be subject to a modern version of the Churchill-Stalin percentages deal – in which the west casually assigns Georgia into Moscow’s “sphere of influence”.
Georgian fears have been stoked by Nato’s failure to give Georgia and Ukraine “membership action plans” at the alliance’s recent summit. It is true that the summit communiqué asserted that the two countries would eventually join Nato. But it is clear that some members of the alliance harbour deep misgivings. François Fillon, the French prime minister, says that: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think it is not the right response to the balance of power in Europe and between Europe and Russia.”
Such language is greeted with dismay in Georgia. Mikhail Saakashvili, the Georgian president, told me last week that Mr Fillon’s comments were: “clearly about spheres of influence, which is bizarre to say the least... What we are talking about is appeasement. And today it might be Georgia and tomorrow Estonia – and then, hypothetically, Finland. Finland was also in Russia’s sphere of influence. It was part of the Russian empire.”
To Mr Saakashvili, spheres of influence belong to the bad old days. US president George W. Bush agrees. He has denounced the Yalta agreement of 1945 – which recognised eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence – as “one of the greatest wrongs of history”.
The arguments against informal recognition of a Russian sphere of influence are powerful. As one western diplomat puts it: “Either the ex-Soviet countries are independent states, or they are not.” As independent countries, Georgia and Ukraine should be free to make their own decisions about their security. As an alliance of free countries, Nato should not allow Russia a veto on who joins the club. In any case, Nato has already let in parts of the former Soviet Union – the three Baltic states – to the alliance. Russia has had to live with this decision.
But the counter-arguments should not be airily dismissed. For all Mr Bush’s impatience with the concept, unstated spheres of influence do still exist in the modern world. There is a powerful moral case for recognising an independent Taiwan. Yet Mr Bush has leant heavily on Taiwan not to declare independence, because China is so implacable on the issue. Taiwan is, de facto, recognised as part of a Chinese sphere of influence.
Georgia and Ukraine are also harder cases than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian culture has deep roots in Ukraine – and opinion polls suggest that the Ukrainian population is divided about Nato membership. Support for Nato membership is much less equivocal in Georgia. But Georgia is locked into territorial disputes with Russia – and its geographical position would make it harder to defend than the Baltic states. Yet, under article five of the Nato treaty, all Nato members would be committed to defending Georgia – a country of less than 5m people – in the event of a Russian attack.
Russia is also stronger and angrier than it was a few years ago, when Nato let in the Balts. And Russia’s concerns are not obviously unreasonable. I was in Georgia at a conference organised by the Brookings Institution. One of the American participants mused: “If the Russians were concluding military alliances with Mexico and Canada, I think we might have some concerns.”
The official American response is less understanding. The Bush administration argues that Nato is a defensive alliance and that Russian concerns are irrational and outmoded. As Mr Bush put it as his recent summit with Mr Putin: “The cold war is over.”
But the Russians are not reassured. On my last visit to Moscow, Grigory Yavlinsky, a liberal politician, explained to me that Nato’s military intervention in Kosovo had made it much harder for Russian liberals to make a pro-western case. Yes, Mr Yavlinsky said, Nato might have intervened on human-rights grounds – but the Russian population knows that its own army has committed human rights abuses in Chechnya. If Nato could bomb Belgrade in a war over human rights, why could it not bomb Moscow?
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e40e89f2-0a39-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1
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Government doubles assistance to orphan children
Quote: The Cabinet of Ministers increased monthly assistance to orphan children from UAH 795 to UAH 1,590 (USD 1 - UAH 5.05), Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko told reporters.
She noted that the step will encourage Ukrainian citizens to adopt orphan children to their families. "We will further continue implementation of a strategic program on reduction of the number of orphan children and homeless children in the country," the Premier stressed.
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/printable_article?art_id=126094961
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She noted that the step will encourage Ukrainian citizens to adopt orphan children to their families. "We will further continue implementation of a strategic program on reduction of the number of orphan children and homeless children in the country," the Premier stressed.
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/printable_article?art_id=126094961
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Libya-Ukraine Reach Oil Deal
Quote: Yushchenko told Ukrainian television network ICTV on Sunday, "We want Ukraine to produce its own oil in Libya. We have reached an agreement with Qaddafi that one of the four oil fields - which were given to Ukraine in 2003 and which it has lost since -- will be returned to Kiev."Yushchenko went on to add that the Libyan leader will be traveling to Ukraine lat
.er this year, and that the construction of a refinery in the Ukraine by Libya would be discussed during the visit, AFP reported.
http://www.ukrainians.ca/content/view/743/1/lang,en/
.er this year, and that the construction of a refinery in the Ukraine by Libya would be discussed during the visit, AFP reported.
http://www.ukrainians.ca/content/view/743/1/lang,en/
Harsh Russian statements on Ukraine, Georgia, NATO are harmful to Russia - Nikonov
Quote: Moscow's combative response to the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO will bring only harm to the country, because it will be seen as a threat from Russia and will push these countries toward NATO with an added force, political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov said.
"I think such discussion is harmful. Whatever the Russian side says, this will be used by Georgian and Ukrainian propaganda to strengthen the position of those in favor of NATO," Nikonov told Interfax on Friday.
Russian statements on this issue will be seen by Tbilisi and Kyiv as a "threat coming from Russia," he said.
"Therefore I consider the conversations on this issue, especially discussion of details of possibly response measures to be counterproductive," Nikonov said.
Whatever Russian politicians say on these response measures, "it will be used by those people who have got the task from the leadership of the relevant countries to make every effort to join NATO," he said.
"I think all Russian politicians and experts should be restrained in this issue," he said.
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775068293&start=3
"I think such discussion is harmful. Whatever the Russian side says, this will be used by Georgian and Ukrainian propaganda to strengthen the position of those in favor of NATO," Nikonov told Interfax on Friday.
Russian statements on this issue will be seen by Tbilisi and Kyiv as a "threat coming from Russia," he said.
"Therefore I consider the conversations on this issue, especially discussion of details of possibly response measures to be counterproductive," Nikonov said.
Whatever Russian politicians say on these response measures, "it will be used by those people who have got the task from the leadership of the relevant countries to make every effort to join NATO," he said.
"I think all Russian politicians and experts should be restrained in this issue," he said.
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007539&docId=l:775068293&start=3
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